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Wonky Walden: The Dizzying New Personal
Jurisdiction Rule
I. INTRODUCTION
Even prior to Walden v. Fiore, determining if a court had
authority over an out-of-state defendant was a “labyrinth with no
exit.” 1 Over the years, that labyrinth has mutated. Born of federalist
principles in the 1870s, personal jurisdiction analysis has long since
shifted toward ensuring defendants’ due process rights. 2 With its
evolving core purpose, it is little wonder that nailing down
appropriate applications on the fringes is difficult.
Consistent with this difficulty, some commentators have
criticized the United States Supreme Court as “incapable of
providing a coherent vision of the law of personal jurisdiction,” 3
crediting the Court for producing “an ever-widening doctrinal
morass” where “fundamental principles [are] submerged beneath
mechanistic formulas that are both too broad and too narrow.” 4 As a
result, due process has become “nothing more than a complex web
of fact-specific outcomes.” 5
Walden v. Fiore is the court’s most recent foray into this morass.
No one claims that Walden clarifies the personal jurisdiction
conundrum; at best, the case is seen as a dud. 6 But Walden is not a
dud. Walden injects dizzying twists and turns into the minimum
contacts maze. 7 First, Walden has compounded any pre-existing
complexity concerning the proper roles of plaintiff residency and
damage location. 8 Second, Walden’s express language contradicts

1. See generally Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth with No
Exit, 47 AKRON L. REV. 617, 618 (2014).
2. Paul J. Stancil, Walden v. Fiore - Post-Argument, SCOTUSCAST (Dec. 13, 2013),
www.fed-soc.org/multimedia/detail/walden-v-fiore-post-argument-scotuscast.
3. E.g. Grossi, supra note 1, at 618.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 637.
6. See infra Part VI.
7. See infra Part III.
8. Id.
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commonsensical trends toward expanded personal jurisdiction,
inviting courts to err on the side of denying personal jurisdiction. 9
The world is shrinking. Advances in technology and
transportation are dissolving interstate jurisdictional burdens. 10 These
advances had naturally lent to expanding state power to pull in outof-staters to protect resident people and property. 11 Then
Walden appeared.
This Note exposes Walden’s unappreciated mess. Part II
addresses how Walden should have come out differently under
precedent. Part III showcases the disarray that is Walden’s new
personal jurisdiction rule. Part IV highlights the failure of lower
courts to appreciate Walden’s departure from the previously
understood role of plaintiff residency and damage location in
jurisdictional analysis. Part V recommends a return to pre-Walden
analysis—the lesser of evils—and bolsters that argument by looking
to the domestic doctrines of other Western countries, specifically
Canada and England. Part VI concludes.
II. PRE-WALDEN ANALYSIS APPLIED TO WALDEN
The Court in Walden v. Fiore did not find personal jurisdiction to
exist in Nevada when Georgia officers allegedly intentionally
confiscated and unlawfully delayed the return of thousands of dollars
by falsifying an affidavit when they knew or should have known the
money rightfully belonged to Nevada gamblers, and consequently

9. Id.
10. Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 765–66 (Ill.
1961) (“[T]oday’s facilities for transportation and communication have removed much of the
difficulty and inconvenience formerly encountered in defending lawsuits brought in
other States.”).
11. See id. at 766 (“Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about
by technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may have been
reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to reality, and injustice rather than
justice is promoted. Our unchanging principles of justice, whether procedural or substantive in
nature, should be scrupulously observed by the courts. But the rules of law which grow and
develop within those principles must do so in the light of the facts of economic life as it is lived
today. Otherwise the need for adaptation may become so great that basic rights are sacrificed
in the name of reform, and the principles themselves become impaired.”).
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could not be used in Nevada or anywhere else over the course of
seven months. 12
If the Supreme Court had simply followed precedent—as it
claimed it did 13—the Court would likely have found the defendant to
have sufficient minimum contacts. First, it appears that the officers
who allegedly created the false affidavit knew the gamblers’ Nevada
residency by the time they falsified the document. Second, the
resulting delay in the return of the gamblers’ cash caused foreseeable
harm in Nevada.
A. Pre-Walden Tortious Minimum Contacts Analysis Counted
Contacts with State Residents and Damage Location
Prior to Walden v. Fiore, it was well accepted, even at the
Supreme Court itself, that plaintiff residency was not only a relevant
but a potentially pivotal part of the minimum contacts inquiry for
intentional torts. While plaintiff residency alone has not been
determinative, there is little doubt that plaintiff residency had the
power to push the minimum contacts pendulum toward personal
jurisdiction—especially when that residency was known and the
ultimate damages took place in the residency state.
Perhaps the most striking proof that plaintiff residency matters in
tort minimum contacts analysis is the following line from Calder v.
Jones, a case quoted several times in Walden: “[P]etitioners are
primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed
at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on
that basis.” 14
In Calder, two employees of a national magazine company who
resided in Florida helped publish an allegedly libelous story about a
California resident. 15 The employees challenged a California court’s
personal jurisdiction over them because neither was in California at

12. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119–26 (2014); Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838,
842–60 (9th Cir. 2011).
13. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1126 (“Well-established principles of personal jurisdiction
are sufficient to decide this case.”).
14. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (emphasis added). However, the Walden
court chose never to grapple directly with that particular line, instead selectively pointing to
Calder’s language favorable to Walden’s change in jurisdictional direction.
15. Id. at 785–86.
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any time for any activity related to the claims brought against them.16
However, the Supreme Court found both employees had minimum
contacts with California “such that the maintenance of the suit [did]
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,”17
relying heavily on the fact that the out-of-state conduct was aimed at
a California resident. 18
Calder also provides evidence of the importance of the location
of tortious conduct’s “effects” or injury. In addition to Calder’s
finding that jurisdiction was proper based on plaintiff residency, 19 the
Court also found it proper based on the damage location:
“Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based
on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” 20 The Court
did not find that all of the effects of the out-of-state conduct
occurred in the forum, but instead that “the brunt of the harm, in
terms both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her
professional reputation, was suffered in California.” 21
The same year as Calder, the Court took another opportunity to
establish the relevance of damage location while also reiterating the
proper role of the plaintiff ’s residency.
The plaintiff’s residence is not, of course, completely irrelevant to
the jurisdictional inquiry. As noted, that inquiry focuses on the
relations among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.
Plaintiff’s residence may well play an important role in determining
the propriety of entertaining a suit against the defendant in the
forum. That is, plaintiff’s residence in the forum may, because of
defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff, enhance defendant’s
contacts with the forum. Plaintiff’s residence may be the focus of
the activities of the defendant out of which the suit arises. 22

16. Id.
17. Id. at 788–89 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 789–90.
19. Id. at 790.
20. Id. at 789; see also Gray Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761,
762–63 (Ill. 1961) (“It is well established, however, that in law the place of a wrong is where
the last event takes place which is necessary to render the actor liable [i.e., damage].”).
21. Calder, 465 U.S at 789.
22. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984); Calder, 465 U.S. at
788–89; McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See also William J. Knudsen, Jr.’s
interpretation of Keeton in his article, Keeton, Calder, Helicopteros and Burger King—
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Though dicta, that explanation from Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc. is perhaps the Supreme Court’s clearest articulation of the role
of plaintiff residency in minimum contacts analysis. 23 According to
Keeton—another tort case concerning not only non-resident
defendants but also a non-resident plaintiff—plaintiff residency in
the chosen forum is not strictly required, but when present, it should
be relevant and sometimes even weighty. 24
Regarding damage location, Keeton gave weight even when “the
bulk of the harm done . . . occurred outside [the forum state].” 25
The fact that the suit was, “at least in part, for damages suffered in
[the forum state],” played an important role in the Court’s analysis
because “it is beyond dispute that [the forum state] has a significant
interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the State.” 26
The fact of partial damages within the forum state did not alone
justify personal jurisdiction, but when combined with the
defendant’s “regular circulation of magazines in the forum State,” it
was sufficient. 27
A year after Calder and Keeton, the Court again affirmed the
relevance of plaintiff residency to minimum contacts analysis, this
time beyond the realm of torts. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
an out-of-state franchisee allegedly wrongfully terminated a contract
with its franchisor. 28 The Court found minimum contacts to be
International Shoe’s Most Recent Progeny, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 809, 817 (1985).
“[P]laintiff’s residence may cause insufficient contacts to be ‘enhanced’ so that they meet
constitutional standards. In other words, in a close case, plaintiff’s residence could tip the
scales in favor of jurisdiction.” Id. Knudsen also points out a clear example where plaintiff
residency tipped the scales. Id. at 817–18 (“McGee . . . is a perfect example of such
enhancement because the contacts of defendant insurance company in that case were as
minimal as may be found in any case where the Supreme Court has upheld jurisdiction. The
use of McGee in recognizing the significance of plaintiff’s residence as a factor in the
jurisdictional analysis makes good sense.”).
23. Knudsen, supra note 22, at 817–18. (“The Court has, of course, discussed this
factor [plaintiff residency] before in Kulko, World-Wide Volkswagen, and Rush, but never to the
extent it has in Keeton. Whether Keeton’s clearer articulation of the role of plaintiff’s residence
represents a step forward in jurisdictional analysis, however, is not entirely certain.”).
24. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 (“[P]laintiff’s residence in the forum State is not a separate
requirement, and lack of residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of
defendant’s contacts.”).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 776.
27. Id. at 773.
28. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 466 (1985).
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satisfied because “the defendant [had] ‘purposefully directed’ his
activities at residents of the forum [i.e., the franchisor], and the
litigation result[ed] from alleged injuries that ‘[arose] out of or
relate[d] to’ those activities.” 29 While a contract case, the Burger
King Court suggested via dicta that the purposeful direction
standard could also apply in tort claims. 30 Likely, implied in
purposeful direction is that the alleged victim’s residency is known,
or at least has reason to be known, to the defendant at the time of
the act. Burger King did not suggest that plaintiff residency should
always receive much weight, explicitly rejecting the haling of a
defendant “into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous,
or attenuated contacts.” 31 Thus, it makes sense for unknown plaintiff
residency or residency resulting from unilateral acts after injury to
play little-to-no role in minimum contacts analysis. 32
Through Calder, Keeton, and Burger King, the Supreme Court
made clear the relevance of known plaintiff residency and foreseeable
damage location to minimum contacts analysis and the ultimate
sufficiency of the two when combined. In the nearly three decades
since, the combined personal jurisdiction perspective of these three
cases had gone utterly unchallenged. 33
B. How Walden Likely Comes Out Under the Pre-Walden Standard
Under the pre-Walden standard, the Court should likely have
found the officers who allegedly created the false affidavit to have
sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada. First, it appears that the
officers knew of the gamblers’ Nevada residency at least by the time

29. Id. at 472 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
30. Regarding product liability, “[a] forum State does not exceed its powers under the
Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers in the forum State and those products subsequently injure forum consumers.” Id.
at 473 (internal quotations omitted). Regarding defamation, “a publisher who distributes
magazines in a distant State may fairly be held accountable in that forum for damages resulting
there from an allegedly defamatory story.” Id. (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774; Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783 (1984)).
31. Id. at 475 (internal quotations omitted).
32. Indeed, as far back as 1958, the Court has found “unilateral activity of those who
claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
with the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
33. LexisNexis Shephard’s® report run by author on December 12, 2014.
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of the falsification. Second, injury flowing from the delay in the
return of the gamblers’ cash occurred in Nevada.
1. Walden’s basic facts
Professional gamblers accused DEA agents of wrongfully seizing
$97,000 of their money while making a connecting flight at a
Georgia airport. 34 At the time of the seizure, the pair was returning
home to Nevada. 35 They allegedly told the officers where they were
headed, though they displayed non-Nevada drivers’ licenses. 36 The
gamblers alleged “the funds were readily identifiable [as] originating
and returning to Las Vegas” to their bank that ordinarily holds their
gambling money. 37 Soon after returning home, the gamblers said
they produced proof of their money’s legitimacy, forwarding that
proof from Las Vegas to the agents. 38 The gamblers also claimed that
“[a]ll defendants recognized at all times that the destination of the
funds at the time of the seizure was . . . Nevada, and that a
substantial amount of the currency had also originated . . . [in]
Nevada.” 39 The officers also allegedly ran background checks of the
gamblers, “searching data bases compiled and maintained
in Nevada.” 40
The gamblers further alleged that the officers falsified an affidavit
which unjustly delayed the cash’s rightful return until seven months
after its initial seizure. 41
Specifically, Fiore and Gipson allege in the complaint that this
probable cause affidavit falsely stated that Gipson had been
uncooperative and had refused to respond to questions; that Fiore
and Gipson had given inconsistent answers during questioning; and
that there was sufficient evidence for probable cause to forfeit the
funds as drug proceeds. 42

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 842–45 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 846, 850.
Id.
Id. at 850.
Id.
Id. at 851.
Id.
Id. at 844.
Id.

689

06.BALINSKI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/4/2016 6:39 PM

2016

Additionally, the gamblers alleged the agents failed to mention
pertinent exculpatory evidence in the affidavit:
. . . that Fiore and Gipson had no history of unlawful drug use or
trade; that they had documentation showing them to be advantage
gamblers; that their bags had passed through an agricultural x-ray
and other inspections used for contraband detection without
incident; that Fiore and Gipson had provided actual receipts for
most of the funds that they carried; and that the $30,000 Gipson
was carrying could be traced directly to a legal source, his winnings
at El San Juan Casino. 43

2. Pre-Walden law applied to Walden
There is “some general agreement” that likely the most relevant
precedential test came from Calder v. Jones. 44 According to Calder,
“personal jurisdiction may be determined based on a three-part test:
(1) the defendant committed an intentional act; (2) the act was
aimed at the forum state; and (3) the harm caused would be
experienced in the forum state.” 45
Just like in Calder, where magazine employees “[were] primary
participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a
California resident, and jurisdiction over them [was] proper on that
basis,” 46 the DEA agents were primary participants in “alleged
wrongdoing intentionally directed” 47 at Nevada residents. Thus,
Nevada jurisdiction over them should likely be “proper on
that basis.” 48
If at the time of the initial seizure of the gamblers’ money in an
Atlanta airport the officers had no knowledge of the gamblers’

43. Id.
44. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for law students (sponsored by Bloomberg Law): Gambling
on
personal
jurisdiction, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov.
1,
2013,
11:41
AM),
www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-lawgambling-on-personal-jurisdiction/ (“There is some general agreement that the relevant test
comes from the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Calder v. Jones”).
45. Id.
46. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (emphasis added). However, the Walden
court chose never to grapple directly with that particular line, instead selectively pointing to
Calder’s language favorable to Walden’s change in jurisdictional direction.
47. Id.
48. Id.

690

06.BALINSKI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

683

8/4/2016 6:39 PM

Wonky Walden

Nevada residency, 49 it is difficult to argue the officers at that time
aimed their conduct at Nevada—a forum then unknown. However,
by the time of the drafting of the allegedly false affidavit, the officers
“definitely knew . . . that [the gamblers] had a significant connection
to Nevada.” 50
First, at the time of the seizure, the pair told the officers they
were heading to Nevada, and their tickets should have confirmed
that fact. 51 Second, the cash is described as “identifiable [as]
originating and returning to Las Vegas.” 52 Third, soon after
returning to Nevada, the gamblers supposedly “forwarded” their
supporting documents from Las Vegas. 53 Fourth, the agents
themselves allegedly searched “data bases compiled and maintained
in Nevada” 54 to find out more about the gamblers. Taking those
allegations as true, it is quite likely the agents had a fair idea which
state the gamblers belonged to at the time. Therefore, the contact
the agents had with Nevada through its residents by way of the
affidavit was anything other than “random, fortuitous,
or attenuated.” 55
In other words, like the corporation in Burger King which, in
part, “‘purposefully directed’ . . . activities at residents of the forum”
by way of a contract, 56 the agents purposefully directed activities at
residents of Nevada by way of an affidavit. By the time of the
affidavit, the agents likely knew to which state the gamblers
belonged. Though the affidavit did not create an ongoing
relationship like the contract in Burger King, the affidavit should still
be a relevant contact. And, just like in Burger King, where the
alleged damages related to the purposeful direction—the contractual

49. Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 862 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen
Walden seized the cash, he knew only that the plaintiffs had California driver’s licenses and
were headed to Las Vegas. The complaint does not even hint that Walden learned of plaintiffs’
ties to Las Vegas until after the seizure was complete.”).
50. Id. at 850.
51. Id. at 850, 853.
52. Id. at 850.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 851.
55. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
56. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 479–80 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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relationship—the bulk of the damages to the gamblers flows directly
from the purposeful direction—the affidavit.
Moreover, just like in Calder, where the Court also found
jurisdiction proper “based on the ‘effects’ of . . . Florida conduct in
California,” 57 the Court should have found jurisdiction over the
agents proper based on the effects of Georgia conduct in Nevada.
Arguably, the “brunt of the harm” 58 flowing from the alleged
wrongful detainment and the delayed return to the cash’s rightful
owners in Nevada occurred in Nevada, where the gamblers would
have most likely spent that money. But even if the “brunt of the
harm” was not felt in Nevada as in Calder, 59 at the very least “part”
of the harm occurred there as in Keeton. 60 While the location of
“part” of the damages was not alone sufficient in Keeton, it did
suffice in the presence of other factors. 61 Here, the known residency
of the Nevada gamblers could potentially be an augmenting factor. 62
Unsurprisingly, the Ninth Circuit found that Nevada courts had
specific personal jurisdiction over the agents, hinging its decision on
“key facts” which included the fact that the agents had allegedly
wronged Nevada residents who were returning home. 63 The agents
knew that the travelers were Nevada residents and that Nevada was

57. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
58. Id. (stating that one of the reasons the court had jurisdiction is because “the brunt
of the harm . . . was suffered in California”).
59. Id.
60. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984).
61. Id. at 773–74.
62. The following is helpful way of summarizing the most convincing arguments for
Nevada jurisdiction over the agents in this case:
Jurisdiction arises from the fact that petitioner, knowing that respondents were
Nevada residents and having received exculpatory evidence from them in Nevada,
submitted a false affidavit that prevented the return of funds money to them in
Nevada. There is no question that this conduct caused injury, which obviously was
suffered somewhere. That place certainly was not Georgia; by the time petitioner
wrote his affidavit, respondents had long since departed Atlanta and were, instead,
back at home in Nevada. The only sensible place to locate the occurrence of the
injury is where respondents were living and working during the time in which they
were deprived of their funds. That rule is easy enough to administer and avoids the
prospect of giving plaintiffs an unlimited choice of fora.
Brief for Respondent at 43, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (No. 12-574).
63. Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 848 (9th Cir. 2011).
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their final destination. 64 Thus, “[the agents’] actions were
‘performed with the purpose of having’ its ‘consequences felt’ by
someone in [Nevada].” 65 In other words, the Ninth Circuit
appropriately applied Supreme Court precedent. It is true that the
Supreme Court had not yet heard a case quite like the gamblers’, but
there is no meaningful minimum contacts distinction between
Calder and this case, except perhaps that the relationship and harm
began in Georgia. At its core, the allegedly falsified affidavit was not
a far cry from Calder’s defamatory article. Both concerned the
communication of lies that caused damage in a predictable forum. 66
Though Justice Ikuta dissented from the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion, her dissatisfaction with the plurality’s opinion was that she
did not see the falsification of the affidavit and its resulting delay in
the return of funds as a cognizable tort. 67 The only possible tortious
conduct Justice Ikuta saw in the case was the initial seizure of the
funds. 68 To that conduct—and that conduct alone—she applied the
same minimum contacts standard as the majority:
In determining whether the defendant “purposefully directed” the
activities which are the subject of plaintiff ’s claim to the forum
state, we consider whether the defendant “(1) committed an
intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing
harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the
forum state.” 69

From the perspective of the initial seizure, she found no express
aiming because “[a]s a matter of simple logic, a defendant cannot
‘expressly aim’ an intentional act at a victim’s home state if the
64. Id. at 843 (“When asked for identification, Fiore and Gipson showed their
California drivers’ licenses and stated that they had California residences, as well as residences in
Las Vegas. They further informed the DEA agents ‘that Las Vegas was the final destination of
most if not all of the funds in their possession’ and that they were returning to their Las Vegas
residences.”) (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 851 (quoting Ibrahim v. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1259 (9th
Cir. 2008)).
66. Though one notable difference is that with the defamatory article all that was
wrongfully taken was someone’s intangible reputation, whereas with the affidavit, the taking of
tangible property was perpetuated.
67. See Fiore, 657 F.3d at 860, 863 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
68. See id.
69. Id. at 862 (quoting Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
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defendant committing the action does not even know that the victim
has any connection with that state.” 70 At the time of the seizure, the
agents likely did not know the gamblers’ ties to Nevada, and,
therefore, could not have aimed at Nevada at that time, according to
Justice Ikuta. 71 However, if Justice Ikuta had also applied her
standard to the later conduct of the affidavit, thereby recognizing
that act as a recoverable part of the gamblers’ grievance, she would
have had little, if any, basis for her dissent.
Under established precedent, 72 the Court should have held that
the officers who allegedly created a false affidavit causing the delayed
return of the gamblers’ funds constituted sufficient minimum
contacts with Nevada. First, the officers likely knew the gamblers’
Nevada residency—at least by the time of the affidavit. Second, at
least some of the injury caused by the affidavit-induced delay
occurred in Nevada.
III. WALDEN’S INCOMPREHENSIBLE RULE
The new rule coming out of Walden is not as clear-cut as it
initially may seem; in fact, in the greater context of the entire ruling,
Walden’s minimum contacts rule for intentional torts is
incomprehensible: “The proper focus of the ‘minimum contacts’
inquiry in intentional-tort cases is ‘the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ . . . And it is the

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Given the shakiness of the Supreme Court’s ruling, it is easy to speculate that other
arguments that did not make it into the opinion itself drove the decision-making. One such
possibility is that a special interest—specifically government agents—was the target of the
litigation.
The Solicitor General filed a brief urging the Court to reject the Ninth Circuit
standard and [took] part in the oral argument. A number of states also filed a friendof-the-court brief warning that the Ninth Circuit’s approach would make law
enforcement officers subject to lawsuits in states with which they have no real
connection and in which defending against claims will be extremely inconvenient,
costly, and unpredictable.
Wermiel, supra note 44. “The personal jurisdiction question likely has broad[] implications for
litigation throughout the country, and especially for members of law enforcement (whose
concerns are aired by several amici on Walden’s side, including the United States).” William
Baude, Argument preview: Where can a federal agent be sued?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 30, 2013,
3:49 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/argument-preview-where-can-a-federal-agent-besued/; see also Stancil, supra note 2.
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defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must create contacts
with the forum State.” 73 Commentators have attempted their “Plain
English” summary in the following way:
[Y]ou cannot force somebody to travel to a far-off place to litigate
a case if they have no connection to that place. If you want to sue
somebody in a particular state, you need to show that they have
made contact with the state — either by committing an act in that
state, or at least by intentionally reaching out to the state somehow.
But you cannot sue them simply because you live in the state and
you have been hurt. 74

This thousand-foot view of Walden’s rule makes it seem like
nothing but a regurgitation of precedent; however, problems abound
in the willows. First, Walden leaves ambiguity about the role—if
any—plaintiff residency has in the minimum contacts analysis.
Second, Walden tries in vain to draw an impenetrable line between
state contacts and contacts with state residents harmed within
their state.
A. Walden’s Mixed Messages About the Relevance of Plaintiff
Residency
Walden leaves us with a grab bag of contradictory statements
regarding the role of plaintiff residency in minimum contacts
analysis. Walden first pronounces that plaintiff residency has no place
in the discussion, even when that residency is known. But in the
same breath, Walden suggests plaintiff residency is in fact relevant to,
even if not independently sufficient for, minimum contacts analysis.
On the one hand, Walden holds that plaintiff residency—even if
known to defendant at the commission of a tort—is not a minimum
contacts consideration. First, Walden states, “[M]inimum contacts
analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself,
not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” 75 The Court
then goes so far as to say that “when viewed through the proper

73. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783, 788 (1984)) (citation omitted).
74. William Baude, Opinion analysis: The boundaries of specific jurisdiction,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 26, 2014, 2:37 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/opinion-analysisthe-boundaries-of-specific-jurisdiction/ [hereinafter Baude, Boundaries].
75. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
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lens,” the agents’ alleged intentional drafting of a false affidavit
about known Nevada residents that wrongfully delayed the return of
money known to belong to those residents “formed no
jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Nevada.” 76 In other words, the
Court says that a plaintiff ’s residency, even if known, is not a
“jurisdictionally relevant contact[]”. 77 As if attempting to eradicate
any doubt about the absolute irrelevancy of plaintiff residency, the
Court concludes, “[I]t is the defendant, not the plaintiff . . . who
must create contacts with the forum State.” 78 The Court also states
that the “reality” is that “none of [the agents’] challenged conduct
had anything to do with Nevada itself.” 79 However clear these
messages may seem in isolation, when taken in the context of the
Court’s entire opinion, the overall doctrine is far from certain.
There are multiple times when Walden contradicts itself and
suggests plaintiff residency is actually relevant to minimum contacts
analysis. When the Court says “the mere fact that [defendants’]
conduct affect[s] plaintiffs with connections to the forum State does
not suffice to authorize jurisdiction,” 80 the Court is implying that
plaintiff residency is relevant. When the Court relies on Calder and
says that “mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient
connection to the forum,” 81 the Court is implying that plaintiff
residency is relevant. Thus, while some of Walden’s plain language
makes no room for plaintiff residency, other language suggests
its relevance.
The only statement in Walden which attempts to reconcile this
apparent friction is too vague to clarify anything meaningful—it only
points out the obvious. The Court says the following: “To be sure, a
defendant’s contacts with the forum State may be intertwined with
his transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties. But
a defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing
alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” 82 First, for there to be
a lawsuit there must be some kind of interaction or transaction that
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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went sour with a party and it goes without saying that the negative
interaction must be tied to a forum state. The question is whether a
part of that tie to a forum state is a plaintiff ’s known residency, and
the Court does nothing to repair its contradictory answers to that
question. Pointing out that “a defendant’s relationship with a
plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction,” 83 is not helpful either. First, that observation is vague.
More importantly, that observation addresses sufficiency,
not relevancy.
Walden leaves a mess for lower courts and litigators to grapple
with: Are plaintiff residency and the location of damages relevant to
personal jurisdiction analysis, or not? Some language in Walden
implies, “Yes.” This is in harmony with well-vetted precedent that, as
shown below, seems to make sense. However, Walden’s strongest
language apparently rebuffs reason by saying, “No, neither plaintiff
residency nor the location of damages is relevant.”
B. Walden Attempts to Divorce Contacts with the State from Contacts
with Known State Residents
To the extent Walden is meant to preclude consideration of
plaintiff residency, it attempts to draw an impossible line—
unsupported by precedent— between “contacts with the forum State
itself” and “contacts with persons who reside there.” 84
Walden tries to justify its unproductive exercise of detaching a
forum from its residents by pointing to language in both
International Shoe and Burger King, which hardly lend the soughtafter support. First, Walden quotes from International Shoe language
that actually says nothing about plaintiff residency: “Due process
‘does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in
personam against an individual . . . with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations.” 85 The insufficiency of zero contacts says
nothing about relevancy of any particular type of contact, including
contact with a plaintiff.

83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 1122 (“[O]ur ‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”).
85. Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
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Second, the Court looks to Burger King, which similarly fails to
support a bar to consideration of plaintiff residency and instead
focuses on the insufficiency of “random, fortuitous, or attenuated”
contacts. 86 Though there may be times when plaintiff residency is
“random, fortuitous, or attenuated” and Burger King could be used
to support excluding such a contact from the minimum contacts
arithmetic, Burger King says nothing about un-random, unfortuitous, or un-attenuated plaintiff residency. As shown, neither
Burger King, nor International Shoe support a wholesale divorce
between contacts with a forum from contacts with a
forum’s residents.
Even if creating such a partition were justified by precedent, it
still would not make sense to draw a distinction between a forum
and a forum’s residents. What is a forum? Is it not, at least in part,
logical to conclude that a forum includes the sum of its residents?
Can a defendant affect a resident without, by extension to some
degree, affecting the state in which that resident resides? It makes
little sense to allow a state to claim responsibility for its residents but
deny consideration of those relationships in minimum contacts
analysis. It is not “unconstitutional alchemy” 87 to accept residents as
logical extensions of their states—if not residents, then with whom
does a party interact at all? Walden outruns reason by holding that a
false affidavit regarding known Nevada residents did not have
“anything to do with Nevada itself.” 88
IV. WALDEN’S MESS UNAPPRECIATED
It appears lower courts have swallowed Walden’s pitch that its
holding did not change anything. As shown above, regardless of
what the Court tries to say about it, there is no way “[w]ellestablished principles of personal jurisdiction [were] sufficient to

86. Id. at 1123 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
87. Brief for Petitioner, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (No. 12-574), 2013
LEXIS 2472, at *12–13 (“That respondents have connections with Nevada and felt harm
there is purely incidental to petitioner’s alleged conduct. Transforming respondents’
connections with Nevada into connections between petitioner and Nevada is
unconstitutional alchemy.”).
88. Walden, 134 S. Ct at 1125 (“[N]one of petitioner’s challenged conduct had
anything to do with Nevada itself.”).
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decide this case” based on the Court’s reasoning. 89 Of the 195 cases
mentioning Walden, none have criticized the ruling. 90 The closest
any court has come to rebellion is distinguishing its facts. 91 In fact, at
least one federal district court has expressly denied Walden changed
anything: “Walden . . . left undisturbed established Supreme Court
precedent.” 92 That case is worth dissecting briefly because if the
district court had actually appreciated Walden’s chaotic doctrinal
narrowing of personal jurisdiction, that case likely would have flipped
a u-ey. 93
A. Jenkins v. Miller
Jenkins v. Miller is a federal district court case about whether a
Vermont court should have personal jurisdiction over four out-ofstate defendants who allegedly assisted in a parental kidnapping from
Virginia to Nicaragua. 94 The four defendants’ motions to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction were previously denied, but postWalden, they “renewed their motions to dismiss in light of . . .
Walden.” 95 Notwithstanding Walden, the court again found personal
jurisdiction over the four defendants under the assumption that
Walden “left undisturbed established Supreme Court precedent, and
[did] not dictate an alteration.” 96
1. Jenkins’s basic facts
In Jenkins, a daughter was born into a same-sex civil union. 97
The couple soon dissolved their union and the biological mother

89. Id. at 1126.
90. LexisNexis Shephard’s® report run by author on January 2, 2015.
91. Seventeen of the 195 cases have distinguished their facts from Walden. See id.
92. Jenkins v. Miller, No. 2:12-cv-184, 2014 WL 3530365, at *5 (D. Vt. July
15, 2014).
93. Another case worth exploring is one which came out pre-Walden and would likely
have come out much differently post-Walden. In 2011, an Idaho district court found sufficient
contacts over an out-of-state defendant for merely inducing independent contractors to
abandon their contracts with an Idaho-based company. Melaleuca, Inc. v. Organo Gold Int’l,
No. 4:10-CV-420-LMB, 2011 WL 3490244, at *5–6 (D. Idaho Aug. 9, 2011).
94. Jenkins, 2014 WL 3530365, at *1–5.
95. Id. at *1.
96. Id. at *5.
97. Id. at *1.
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moved with her daughter from Vermont to Virginia. 98 A Vermont
court determined the parental rights of the mother and ex-partner,
granting full custody to the mother and visitation rights to the expartner. 99 After a time of partial compliance with the visitation
schedule, the biological mother allegedly fled the country with her
daughter. 100 Soon after the mother left the country with her
daughter, the court changed the child’s custody, transferring the
mother’s rights to her ex-partner. 101
The ex-partner subsequently sued those she believed assisted in
the biological mother’s removal of the child from Virginia to New
York, then to Canada, and ultimately to Nicaragua. 102 Four
defendants renewed a previously-denied motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction after Walden’s ruling. 103 The four consisted of a
company, the company’s president, the president’s daughter, and a
founder of the Protect Isabella Coalition. 104 A cell phone owned by
the company and another owned by the president made the trip
from Virginia to New York the same day the mother traveled from
Virginia to New York. 105 The president and his daughter allegedly
called the mother’s father to set up “a rendezvous at a parking lot
where [the mother] abandoned her car” in New York. 106 The
president also purportedly helped send money and supplies—
solicited from donors by the president’s daughter—to the mother in
Nicaragua. 107 The Coalition’s founder allegedly encouraged her to
flee with the child and helped create a fund and a Facebook page
devoted to supporting the idea. 108 The founder also “advised anyone
with knowledge of [the mother’s] whereabouts not to reveal it.” 109

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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2. Jenkins’s analysis
According to the Vermont district court, it had jurisdiction over
the four defendants because they had “allegedly interfered with [the
ex-partner’s] parental rights.” 110 These rights “arose out of a
Vermont civil union and subsequent Vermont Family Court
rulings” 111 and “were to be exercised in Vermont.” 112 Relying on
Calder, the court held that such “intentional and tortious out-ofstate activity” aimed at a resident and causing in-state damages
satisfied personal jurisdiction. 113 According to the court, Walden
“presented a very different set of facts” and did not change the law
from how it was understood under Calder. 114
3. How Jenkins actually comes out under Walden
The Jenkins court is correct that Walden “presented a very
different set of facts” 115 but is wrong in thinking those differences
should tip the scale toward jurisdiction under Walden. If anything,
the differences of contacts in Jenkins would seem to justify personal
jurisdiction even less than the insufficient contacts in Walden. In
Walden, DEA agents’ out-of-state activities causing in-state damages
against known state residents were insufficient to support personal
jurisdiction. 116 Unlike Walden, it is completely unestablished in
Jenkins whether the defendants knew or had reason to know the
plaintiff was a Vermont resident. If anything, that fact would seem to
make the contacts more “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” 117 than
those in Walden.
Regardless, as with the DEA agents, there do not appear to be
any jurisdictionally relevant contacts between the alleged kidnapping
conspirators and the forum state. According to the most
straightforward reading of Walden, plaintiff residency is no longer

110. Id. at *5.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *4.
113. See id.
114. Id. at *5.
115. Id.
116. See supra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2.
117. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
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relevant. 118 The fact that the ex-partner was a Vermont resident
should no longer have place in the post-Walden analysis. While
personal jurisdiction over the alleged conspirators may have been
justified pre-Walden (though still doubtful), it is reasonably clear
that personal jurisdiction should not be possible post-Walden. It is
not established that any of the alleged conspirators ever set foot in
Vermont, ever sent anything to Vermont, or had any Walden-like
contact with Vermont. All they ever did was make decisions that that
happened to hurt someone who coincidently was a Vermont resident
with Vermont rights. The fact that Vermont courts determined the
plaintiff’s rights should make no material difference after Walden
(although it is unclear if it ever did) because the focus is now on
what the defendants did to aim at the forum, not where the plaintiff
happened to be or which state happened to be interested in
protecting that plaintiff ’s rights.
If intentionally keeping money out of the custody of its known
rightful owners in Nevada is insufficient, then helping keep a child
from an occasional visit to a part-time parent—who may not even be
known to live in Vermont—should likewise be insufficient.
Jenkins v. Miller exemplifies how dozens of courts have failed to
appreciate Walden’s potential impact on personal jurisdiction
analysis. While other courts have implied by their absence of criticism
that they agree Walden did not change anything, Jenkins—which
should have looked on Walden with a critical eye—has expressly
argued that Walden left precedent unaltered.
V. PLEA TO RETURN TO PRE-WALDEN ANALYSIS
Walden should be overruled. Pre-Walden personal jurisdiction
analysis, while far from perfect, was more helpful. Not only does
Walden set the stage for discriminatory and unpredictable
enforcement through its contradictions, but the opinion tends to
minimize—perhaps even erase—the weight once rightfully given to
damage location and contacts with people and property tied to a
state. Giving weight to damage location and contacts with people
and property tied to a state is in harmony with the territorial legacy
laid down by the Court as far back as Pennoyer. Further, Walden lays

118. See supra Section III.A.
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the foundation for absurd results, especially in light of increased
interstate mobility. Lastly, the protocol in other countries regarding
jurisdiction is more in line with the pre-Walden tradition. While
other countries should not dictate United States law, American
courts can learn from other countries and can find persuasive their
perspectives on fairness.
A. Walden’s Foundation for Unpredictable and Arbitrary Results
Walden leaves a grab bag of contradictions for lower courts and
litigators to wrestle with, especially regarding the relevance of
plaintiff residency and damage location. 119 Some language implies
predictable plaintiff residency and damage location are relevant, but
explicit language states they are not. 120 Law should not be selfcontradictory. 121 Self-contradictory law creates ambiguity. If courts
and attorneys do not—in fact, cannot—comprehend the law because
it is incomprehensible, there is little doubt that the law will lead to
unpredictable and arbitrary outcomes.
In fact, if Walden were treated as a criminal statutory law, such
ambiguity would make it unconstitutional under the void-forvagueness doctrine. According to that doctrine, “Where the
legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute
may permit a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors,
and juries to pursue their personal predilections.” 122 Just like the
void-for-vagueness doctrine, 123 personal jurisdiction finds it roots in
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. There is no reason the
United States Supreme Court should not strive for the same level of
clarity it requires of legislatures. Just as when a legislature lays down
incomprehensible law, the Court’s contradictory rulings “may permit
119. See supra Part IV.
120. See supra Section III.A.
121. See John Finnis, Foundations of Practical Reason Revisited, 50 AM. J. JURIS. 109,
110 (2005) (explaining that “purportedly valid propositions of law must not contradict or be
practically inconsistent with each other”); Marvin Zalman, et al., Michigan’s Assisted Suicide
Three Ring Circus—An Intersection of Law and Politics, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 863, 900
n.174 (1997) (stating that rules should be “understandable, must not be contradicted by
overlapping law, [and] must not require the impossible”).
122. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
123. Id. at 353 (“We conclude that the statute as it has been construed is
unconstitutionally vague within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . .”).
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a standardless sweep” that allows lower courts and attorneys to
“pursue their personal predilections.” 124
B. Minimum Contacts Should Consider Predictable Damage to
Plaintiff Residents and Property
Though Walden leaves ambiguity regarding the relevance of
plaintiff residency, property tied to a state, or the presence of
damages in a state, Walden’s strongest language seems to indicate
their irrelevance. 125 This not only contradicts precedent, 126 but
specifically seems to run counter to the territoriality principles in
Pennoyer v. Neff, which provided the backbone of personal
jurisdiction analysis for nearly seventy years. 127 Moreover, ignoring
contacts with people, property, and damages tied to a state could
lead to absurd results. Lastly, looking to other countries indicates no
widespread belief that considering such contacts would be unfair.
1. The territoriality principle of personal jurisdiction supports
considering such factors
Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant once strictly
required the defendant’s “presence within the court’s territorial
jurisdiction.” 128 Presence could be satisfied by service of process on
the defendant while within the state or could be indicated by the
defendant’s ownership of property in the state, though such presence
would only justify jurisdiction up to the value of that property.129
This was the law from at least Pennoyer v. Neff 130 in 1878 until
International Shoe Co. v. Washington 131 in 1945—spanning nearly
seven decades.
International Shoe did not eliminate the relevance of defendant
presence within a state territory, but no longer considered presence a

124. Id. at 358 (internal quotations omitted).
125. See supra Section III.A.
126. See supra Part II, Section III.B.
127. See infra Section V.B.1.
128. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 186 (1977) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878)).
129. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 725, 733–34.
130. Id.
131. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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strict requirement, instead allowing jurisdiction in its absence if the
defendant had “minimum contacts with [a state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.” 132 International Shoe became the basic
framework upon which much personal jurisdiction analysis over outof-state defendants has since been built. 133 One way of looking at it is
that International Shoe simply expanded Pennoyer’s meaning of
“presence” under the territoriality principle to include other ways a
defendant can touch a state without physically being or owning
property there.
Based on the territoriality principle of jurisdiction, and as
recently as 1990, the Court found minimum contacts satisfied when
a defendant merely stepped foot into a state for something entirely
unrelated to a lawsuit because the plaintiff managed to track down
the defendant and serve him process while he was there. 134 Given the
increased interstate mobility of people and things owing to advances
in technology and infrastructure, this type of transient or ambush
jurisdiction seems more “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” 135 than
reasonable. A single layover in a state could satisfy minimum contacts
so long as the plaintiff is opportunist enough to serve a defendant
walking from gate to gate. It is true that if a defendant could travel
to the state once, the defendant could likely travel there again
without too much inconvenience, but given modern circumstances
the same could be true for any state. Most of the time, there is little
difference in the time and expense required of a defendant to fly to
one state versus another. 136
Compared with ambush jurisdiction, it is far more reasonable to
subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of a state which that

132. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
133. See Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some
Conflict-of-Laws Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1235, 1243 (2001); Brian L.
Hazen, Comment, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Supreme Court as Catalyst
for Spurring Legislative Gridlock in State Income Tax Reform, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 1021,
1028 (2013).
134. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 607–28 (1990).
135. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
136. See Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961)
(“[T]oday’s facilities for transportation and communication have removed much of the
difficulty and inconvenience formerly encountered in defending lawsuits brought in
other States.”).

705

06.BALINSKI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

8/4/2016 6:39 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

defendant has knowingly touched in a way related to the lawsuit.
Interacting with a person who resides in a state or property
belonging to a person who resides in a state, or causing injury to
people or property within a state, should all be considered relevant
contacts that may add up to “presence” under International Shoe.
They should not be minimized or rejected as in Walden. This should
be especially true when the defendant knows or has reason to know
of the state ties. After all, people and property are basically
appendages to a state and a state has interest in protecting and
governing them.
Of course, plaintiff residency and damage location should not
always carry equal weight. Like Burger King says, “‘random,’
‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’” contacts should carry little, if any,
weight and that doctrine should not carve an exception for plaintiff
residency. 137 For example, plaintiff residency unlikely to be known to
the defendant at the time of the acts giving rise to injury should not
matter much. Also, if residency merely results from a plaintiff’s postinjury unilateral move, that contact should not matter. 138 However,
where residency exists and the defendant knows or has reason to
know of it at the time of the alleged wrongful acts, plaintiff residency
should not be shrugged off as irrelevant to the minimum contacts
inquiry. Also, just because a defendant does not personally care
where he is inflicting injury does not make the predictable location
of that injury incidental.
2. Ignoring plaintiff residency and damage location could lead to
absurd results
While there is nothing fundamentally unfair about considering
such factors, if courts turn a blind eye to contacts based on where
plaintiffs or their property belong, or where damages occur,
absurdities will likely result. The following three fact patterns
are illustrative.

137. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
138. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322–23, 329 (1980) (illustrating that
plaintiff’s unilateral post-incident move cannot tie a defendant to that new state).
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First, consider a recent Tenth Circuit decision that relied on
Walden139 and came to an absurd conclusion. A Utah financial
company relied on an opinion letter from a New Hampshire law
firm. 140 The letter allegedly “contained falsehoods” and caused
economic damage in Utah. 141 The New Hampshire firm knew that
the financial company requesting the opinion letter was based in
Utah. 142 The firm had been informed that the company was
organized under Utah law. 143 The firm recognized the company as
being “a Utah company” and having a Utah address. 144 The firm had
discussed the letter over the phone with the Utah company and
ultimately sent the opinion letter to the corresponding
Utah address. 145
The Tenth Circuit held that the New Hampshire firm’s ties to
Utah “[did] not suffice under Walden v. Fiore . . . .” 146 The Tenth
Circuit justified its ruling by explaining, “Walden teaches that
personal jurisdiction cannot be based on interaction with a plaintiff
known to bear a strong connection to the forum state.” 147 In other
words, a firm’s setting up a transaction with a known Utah resident,
sending the agreed-upon product into Utah, and causing injury
through that product is insufficient to justify haling the firm into a
Utah court. That means if the Utah company wants relief, it must
now likely travel across the country and litigate in New Hampshire.
Second, consider a hypothetical car stolen from its owner in
Nevada and driven to Georgia, where it is illegally sold. The buyer,
who has never been to Nevada, is told that the car was stolen. Before
buying the car, the buyer noticed the Nevada plates. Even though
the buyer had reason to believe he was perpetuating injury in Nevada
by taking property that belonged in Nevada, the original owner
139. Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)–1, LLC v. Devine, Millimet & Branch, 750
F.3d 1178, 1179 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We conclude that Devine’s contacts with Utah were
insufficient under . . . Walden v. Fiore . . . .”). Though the court relied on Walden, it did not
seem to indicate that it thought Walden was teaching anything new.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1179–80.
142. Id. at 1180.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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could not hale the buyer into a Nevada court. If the owner were to
find his car and the illegal buyer in Georgia, the only likely avenue
for relief would be for him to bring suit in a forum over 2000 miles
from his home. To make this hypothetical more absurd (and more
analogous to what happened in Walden), imagine that instead of the
buyer simply noticing the plates, the seller actually told the buyer
where the owner of the vehicle resided. Would it not be more
reasonable and fair for the defendant to be haled to court in
Nevada—where the owner is known to live and where the car is
known to belong—than to require the plaintiff to bring suit
in Georgia?
Third, consider a hypothetical similar to Jenkins v. Miller, but
with additional facts to make the point clearer. Let’s say the expartner living in Vermont received custody of the daughter prior to
her alleged kidnapping from Virginia. Additionally, imagine that
those accused of aiding and abetting the kidnapping, while never
having been in Vermont, knew the daughter belonged in Vermont in
the custody of the ex-partner. The abettors knew they were causing
injury in Vermont and that was their intention. Would it not be
more reasonable and fair for the abettors to be haled into court in
Vermont than to require the mother to bring suit in whatever state
the abettors happened to reside in or whatever state the daughter
happened to have been abducted in?
There is nothing absurd about weighing where plaintiffs live or
where harm occurs in minimum contacts analysis, but ignoring such
factors may be a recipe for injustice, as illustrated by the above
fact patterns.
3. Domestic law in other Western countries supports such considerations
Western peers, like Canada and England, give weight to plaintiff
residency and the location of damages when determining personal
jurisdiction under domestic law. International peer pressure alone
should not be dispositive in pushing United States courts one way or
the other, but it should be persuasive. “As commerce, and therefore
litigation, becomes more international in character, American

708

06.BALINSKI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

683

8/4/2016 6:39 PM

Wonky Walden

personal jurisdiction . . . rules must be reassessed and perhaps
harmonized with corresponding rules in other countries.” 148
a. Plaintiff residency and the location of damages weigh heavily in
the Canadian personal jurisdiction analysis. Canada does not find it
fundamentally unfair to hale defendants to a forum, even if the
defendant “has little or no connection to the forum” beyond the
plaintiff’s own ties. 149 Also, “as long as damages were suffered in
the . . . jurisdiction,” the court is permitted to hale a defendant,
“even if the defendant ha[s] no other contacts with that
jurisdiction.” 150 “[B]ecause damage is an essential element of any
tort, if the damages complained of occurred in the forum, the tort is
deemed to have been committed in the forum, regardless of whether
the actual tortious conduct occurred somewhere else.” 151
While Canada does not label defendants’ rights as stemming
from due process, Canada does require that lawsuits proceed “in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the
determination of [defendants’] rights and obligations.” 152 Since
“[t]he United States and Canada enjoy perhaps the closest
economic, cultural, and political ties of any other neighboring
countries in the world,” 153 United States courts should not ignore
Canada’s administration of “principles of fundamental justice” in
their own “due process” determinations.
b. The location of damages suffices in England. As in the United
States, British law explicitly includes “due process” in its
vocabulary. 154 In England’s protection of the right that “[n]one shall
be put to answer without due Process of Law,” 155 it has no problem

148. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1996).
149. Stephen J. Maddex, The Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Canada: How U.S.
Defendants Can Be Haled Into Court in Canada . . . And Never See It Coming,
TERRALEX.ORG (Jun. 5, 2009), www.terralex.org/publication/4bc381f127.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Furlan v. Shell Oil Co., 2000 BCCA 404 (Can.)).
152. Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c 44, § I(2)(e), http://lawslois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-12.3/FullText.html.
153. Maddex, supra note 149.
154. Observance of Due Process of Law 1368, 42 Edw. 3 c. 3 (U.K.),
www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw3/42/3/section/III.
155. Id.
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with calling non-resident defendants to task in tort actions, so long
as “damage was suffered” in the forum. 156 Though the exact meaning
of “due process” in England may not align completely with the
meaning attached to those words in the United States, England’s
personal jurisdiction analysis is still persuasive evidence that there is
nothing inherently unfair about haling a defendant to a forum where
he has intentionally caused injury.
VI. CONCLUSION
Instead of offering welcome clarity to personal jurisdiction
obscurity, or even leaving the status quo, Walden v. Fiore created new
twists and turns in the minimum contacts maze. After Walden, the
proper role of plaintiff residency and the location of damages is an
enigma. To the extent Walden’s language seems clear, it appears to
contradict commonsensical precedent at home and abroad,
attempting to divorce people and property from the state they call
home. To date, both courts and commentators have failed to
appreciate Walden’s impact. Walden should not be ignored, nor
should Walden be merely mentioned in passing as if benign: Walden
should be overruled.
Adam Balinski∗

156. Chris Woodruff & Karen Reed, Comparative Study of “Residual Jurisdiction” in
Civil and Commercial Disputes, NAT’L REP. ON RESIDUAL JURISDICTION 6
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